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Abstract
Electronic voting systems have the potential to improve traditional voting
procedures by providing added convenience and flexibility to the voter. Nu-
merous electronic voting schemes have been proposed in the past, but most
of them have failed to provide voter authentication in an efficient and trans-
parent way. On the other hand, GSM (Global System for Mobile commu-
nications) is the most widely used mobile networking standard. There are
more than one billion GSM users worldwide that represent a large user po-
tential, not just for mobile telephony, but also for other mobile applications
that exploit the mature GSM infrastructure. In this paper, an electronic
voting scheme using GSM mobile technology is presented. By integrating
an electronic voting scheme with the GSM infrastructure, we are able to ex-
ploit existing GSM authentication mechanisms and provide enhanced voter
authentication and mobility while maintaining voter privacy.
1 Introduction
In democratic societies, voting is an important tool to collect and reflect peo-
ple’s opinions. Traditionally, voting is conducted in centralised or distributed
places called voting booths. Voters go to voting booths and cast their votes
under the supervision of authorised parties. The votes are then counted man-
ually once the election has finished. With the rapid development of computer
technology and cryptographic methods, electronic voting systems can be em-
ployed that replace the inefficient and most importantly error-prone human
component. To increase the efficiency and accuracy of voting procedures,
computerised voting systems were developed to help collecting and counting
the votes. These include Lever Voting Machines, Punched Cards for Voting,
Optical Mark-Sense Scanners and Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting
systems [1].
For a variety of reasons, voters may be unable to attend voting booths
physically, but need to vote remotely, for example, from home or while
travelling abroad. Hence, there is great demand for remote voting proce-
dures that are easy, transparent, and, most importantly, secure. Today,
the most common way for remote voting is postal voting, where voters cast
their votes by post. However, it lacks proper authentication and involves a
time-consuming procedure. Internet voting was introduced to provide more
flexibility. Because of the inherited security vulnerabilities of the Internet
and computerised systems in general, Internet voting incurred a wide range
of criticism. However, to date many pilot projects in different countries and
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research groups have been carried out. The Secure Electronic Registration
and Voting Experiment (SERVE), an Internet-based voting system built by
Accenture and its subcontractors for the U.S. Department of Defense’s Fed-
eral Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), is the most well-known of this kind.
A thorough analysis of this system can be found in [9].
In this paper, we endeavour to improve mobility and address security
problems of remote voting procedures and systems. We present an electronic
voting scheme using GSM. With more than one billion users1, the GSM au-
thentication infrastructure is the most widely deployed authentication mech-
anism by far. We make use of this well-designed GSM authentication infras-
tructure to improve mobility and security of mobile voting procedures.
The cryptographic protocol of our GSM mobile voting scheme is based on
the earlier work of Fujioka et al. [7]. In our proposed scheme, voters are au-
thenticated by their GSMmobile operators, and the votes are sent using GSM
wireless communication. Voters and their votes cannot be linked and votes
remain secret until the final counting. The Fujioka et al. scheme [7] applies
a public-key based signature scheme for every single voter. By employing
the GSM authentication infrastructure instead, we avoid using a public-key
based solution and employ a full-fledged scheme for every single voter. Hence
the public-key infrastructure overhead is largely reduced.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we give a background
relating to the proposed scheme, including the security features provided by
GSM, and a brief description of the Fujioka et al. scheme [7]; Section 3 define
the security criteria a voting system should fulfil. Section 4 introduces the
proposed protocol, including a list of assumptions, a description of the role of
each system component, and a detailed description of the proposed scheme.
In Section 5, we present an analysis of the security properties of the proposed
scheme and the extent to which the scheme satisfies the security requirements
outlined in Section 3. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 6.
2 Background
In this section, we review the GSM security features, in particular the au-
thentication function. We then briefly review the Fujioka et al. scheme [7].
2.1 Security Features in GSM
GSM is a digital wireless network standard widely used in European and
Asian countries. It provides a common set of compatible services and capa-
1www.gsmworld.com
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bilities to all GSM mobile users [10]. The services and security features to
subscribers are listed in [6] as subscriber identity confidentiality, subscriber
identity authentication, user data confidentiality on physical connections,
connectionless user data confidentiality and signalling information element
confidentiality. They are summarised as follows:
Subscriber identity confidentiality is the property that the subscriber’s
real identity remains secret by protecting her International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity(IMSI), which is an internal subscriber identity used
only by the network, and using only temporary identities for visited
networks.
Subscriber identity authentication is the property that ensures that the
mobile subscriber who is accessing the network or using the service
is the one claimed. This feature is to protect the network against
unauthorised use.
Data confidentiality is the property that the user information and sig-
nalling data is not disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or
processes. This feature is to ensure the privacy of the user information.
In our proposed GSM mobile voting scheme, communication between the
mobile equipment and the GSM network uses standard GSM technology.
Hence GSM security features apply. Among which, the subscriber identity
authentication feature is particularly used in the protocol. The comprehen-
sive descriptions of above security features can be found in [6, 10]. Here, we
only describe the subscriber identity authentication feature in greater detail.
The subscriber identity authentication in GSM is based on a challenge-
response protocol. A random challenge RAND is issued when a mobile sub-
scriber tries to access a visited network. The Authentication Centre (AC)
computes a response SRES from RAND using an algorithm A3 under the
control of a subscriber authentication key Ki, where the key Ki is unique to
the subscriber, and is stored in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) on the
mobile equipment (ME), as well as the Home Location Register (HLR). The
ME also computes a response SRES from RAND as well. Then the value
SRES computed by the ME is signalled to the visited network, where it is
compared with the value SRES computed by the AC. The access of the sub-
scriber will be accepted or denied depending upon the result of comparing
the two values. If the two values of SRES are the same, the mobile sub-
scriber has been authenticated, and the connection is allowed to proceed. If
the values are different, then access is denied. The process is illustrated in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: GSM Authentication
2.2 The Fujioka et al. Scheme
Since the idea of electronic voting was first proposed by Chaum [3], many
electronic voting schemes, both theoretical and practical, have been pro-
posed. According to the mechanism they use to achieve voter privacy, these
voting schemes can be classified as homomorphic encryption schemes, mix-
net schemes and blind signature schemes. Most of the homomorphic and
mix-nets schemes require large amount of computation capabilities. In a mo-
bile environment, the mobile device have limited computational abilities, so
employing schemes with large computation is not practical. Therefore, we
develop our GSM mobile voting scheme based on a blind signature voting
scheme presented by Fujioka et al. in 1992. It is a prototype system based
on blind signatures. It was intended as a practical secret voting scheme for
large scale elections. There are voters, an administrator, and a counter par-
ticipating in the scheme. The scheme assumes that voters and the counter
communicate through an anonymous communication channel [2, 4], which is
a communication channel that allows the communication entities to remain
anonymous throughout the communication. The structure of the scheme was
outlined in [7] as:
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Preparation: A voter fills in a ballot, blinds the ballot using the
blind signature technique to get the administrator’s
signature, and sends it to the administrator.
Administration: The administrator signs the message in which the
voter’s ballot is hidden, and returns the signature to
the voter.
Voting: The voter extracts the ballot with the administrator’s
signature, and sends it to the counter anonymously.
Collecting: The counter publishes a list of received ballots.
Opening: The voter opens her vote by sending her encryption
key anonymously.
Counting: The counter counts the votes and announces the re-
sult.
In this scheme, digital signature, blind signature and bit-commitment
mechanisms were used. As these mechanisms are also the primitive crypto-
graphic elements in our proposed scheme, a brief description of these mech-
anisms is given as follows:
Digital signature [11] is an essential cryptographic primitive for authen-
tication, authorisation, and non-repudiation. It binds a message and a secret
known only to the signer in a way that the public can verify that the message
has been signed by the signer without knowing the secret. In a public-key
encryption based digital signature scheme, the secret is the private key, and
the information that is used by the public to verify the signature is called
the public key.
Blind signature [11] is a signature scheme with special functionality,
where the signer has no knowledge of the message she signs and the signa-
ture. Hence, the signed message cannot be associated with the sender. A
blind signature protocol usually includes three steps: blinding, signing and
unblinding. For example, sender A wants to get a blind signature from signer
B upon message m. Functions g and h are blinding and unblinding functions
that are only known to A, and SB(x) represents the normal digital signature
of B on x. First, sender A blinds the message m with the blinding function
g, namely g(m), and sends it to signer B. Signer B signs g(m) with B’s
signature, as SB(g(m)), and sends it back to sender A. Finally, A unblinds it
with the unblinding function h, as h(SB(g(m))), where h(SB(g(m)))=SB(m).
In the end, sender A obtains signer B’s signature upon message m, without
signer B knowing the messagem and the signature onm, so the signer cannot
link the signed message m to the sender A.
Bit-commitment [11, 12] is the basic component of many cryptographic
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protocols. In a bit-commitment scheme, the sender A sends an encrypted
message m to the receiver B in such a way that when later on A sends B
the key to decrypt the message, B can be confident that it is the right key
to the message m and the decrypted message B gets is the same message m
that A committed to with B.
3 Security Requirements for Voting Schemes
In accordance with [1, 5, 7, 8], we describe a set of voting security criteria.
However, depending on different democratic requirements in different coun-
tries, and the different scales of electronic voting systems, security goals can
vary. General security requirements include democracy, privacy, accuracy,
fairness, verifiability and recoverability.
Democracy: All and only the authorised voters can vote, and each eligi-
ble voter can vote no more than once. Voters can also choose not to
vote. To achieve democracy, voters need to be properly registered and
authenticated, and then there should be a convenient way for them to
cast their votes, for example, availability of different language choices,
special aid for disabled voters, and proper ways for absentee voting and
early voting.
Privacy: All votes remain secret while voting takes place and each individ-
ual vote cannot be linked by any individual or authority to the voter
who casts it. This is important even if the voter herself does not care
about it. In a small-scale voting system, such as a private company or
an organisation, the privacy issue is paramount.
Accuracy: The voting result accurately reflects voters’ choices. In this
case, no vote can be altered, duplicated or eliminated without being
detected.
Fairness: No partial result is available before the final result comes out.
Verifiability: There are two notions of verifiability. The weaker one is
individual verifiability, where any voter can check that her own vote has
been considered in the tally. The stronger one is universal verifiability,
which ensures that any party including observers can be convinced that
the election is fair and the published tally has been correctly computed
from the correctly cast ballots.
6
Recoverability: If any failure, mistake or cheating is detected, there
should be proper methods and procedures and information available
to help recover the voting system. Recounts may take place.
4 The GSM Mobile Voting Scheme
In this section, we introduce our GSM mobile voting scheme. In this scheme,
GSM is used for the voting system to introduce voter mobility and provide
voter authentication. The proposed scheme is based on the electronic voting
scheme proposed by Fujioka et al. [7], as described in Section 2.2.
We start by introducing the different components of the scheme, followed
by stating a list of assumptions on which the protocol is based. Then the
proposed voting scheme is described in detail.
4.1 The Components
• Voting Device (ME): In electronic voting schemes, voters need to use
dedicated voting devices to cast their votes electronically, for instance,
Internet connected computers or DRE machines. In our scheme, the
voting device corresponds to the GSM mobile equipment (ME), which
consists of a GSM SIM card and a GSM card reader, for example,
a GSM phone, a GSM enabled PDA, or a laptop with a GSM card
reader. The device needs to provide a platform to run the voting ap-
plication, which consists of the candidate information, the key storage
and generation functions.
• Authentication Centre (AC): AC is an entity within the GSM net-
work. As described in Section 2.1, AC generates the authentication
parameters and authenticates the mobile equipment. Apart from au-
thenticating the mobile equipment, AC is also an important informa-
tion distribution server in the proposed scheme. AC needs to be trusted
to transfer the messages as required, as discussed in Section 4.2.
• Verification Server (VS): VS belongs to the voting authority, who
organises the voting event. It verifies the legitimacy of the voter and
issues a voting token to the voter. VS also publishes a list of voter
information.
• Collecting and Counting Server (CS): CS is the server that collects
and counts the votes to give the final result. CS’s action need to be
audited by all candidate parties.
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4.2 Assumptions
Our system is based on a number of assumptions that are listed in this
section.
1. We assume that the proposed GSM mobile voting scheme is part of
a voting system, and that voters can choose to vote through different
methods, for example, the voting booth, postal or GSM. If voters want
to vote through GSM, they have to be registered GSM subscribers.
This means that the voters have already registered their real names
and addresses with their mobile operators by presenting their eligible
credentials at the time of subscription.
2. We assume that the GSM mobile operator is trusted to authenticate the
mobile users for the purpose of voting and send the correct information
to VS and CS. We will discuss this in more details in Section 5.
3. We assume that there are means of authenticating a user to access in
the voting application on the mobile phone, for instance, password pro-
tection. This will prevent unauthorised use of the voting application.
4. We also assume the integrity of the voting application on the ME is
maintained throughout the voting event. To achieve this, a Trusted
Platform Module2 may be employed on the ME to provide a secure
platform for running the application and enhancing end-user security.
We will also discuss this further in Section 6.
4.3 Overview
In this section, we outline our GSM mobile voting scheme. It is divided into
three phases: the pre-voting phase, the voting phase and the post-voting
phase.
The Pre-voting Phase: In this phase, the voter installs the application,
fills in the ballot, and obtains a voting token from VS without revealing
the vote. In this paper, we consider the ballot an electronic equivalent
of a paper ballot, which is an electronic form with the voter’s choice of
the candidates. We also define the voting token as the encrypted ballot
signed by VS.
• The voter fills in the ballot, encrypts the ballot, blinds it using
the blinding technique of a blind signature scheme, and sends it
to AC using GSM wireless communication.
2https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/
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• AC authenticates the voter, signs the encrypted ballot and for-
wards the encrypted ballot along with the signature to VS.
• VS checks the signature of AC and the eligibility of the voter, signs
the encrypted ballot with its private key, and sends the signed
encrypted ballot back to the voter.
• The voter checks the signature and retrieves (unblind) the VS-
signed ballot from the message using the retrieving (unblinding)
technique of the blind signature scheme.
The Voting Phase: In this phase, the voter sends the voting token and the
encrypted version of the key to CS, where the key is the one used to
encrypt the ballot.
• The voter sends the voting token to AC, along with the decryption
key of the ballot encrypted with CS’s public key to avoid AC
decrypting the ballot and compromising the privacy of the voter.
• AC encrypts the key again with a randomly generated symmetric
key, which is the same for all voters through the same AC in one
particular voting event.
• Upon receiving the encrypted key and the voting token, CS checks
if the voting token is valid and allocates a serial number to the
voter and sends a confirmation along with the number back to the
voter.
The Post-voting Phase: In this phase, AC sends its decryption key to CS
to retrieve the key, which is used to open the ballot. CS then counts
the votes.
4.4 The GSM Voting Protocol
In this section, we describe the GSM mobile voting scheme in detail. We
start by introducing the notations used in this paper, which are based on the
terms defined in [7], followed by a description of the scheme.
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Vi: Voter i
IDi: Voter Vi’s identification
vi: Vote of voter Vi
Ek(m): The symmetric key encryption of message m using key
k
Pk(m): The public key encryption of message m using public
key k
SA(m): A’s signature scheme on message m
B(v, k): Bit-commitment scheme for message v using key k
g(m, r): Blinding technique for message m and random number
r
h(s, r): Retrieving (unblinding) technique of blind signature
from message s and random number r
The protocol is illustrated in Figure 2.
ME AC VS CS
Commit vi to xi with ki
Blind xi get ei
1.   < IDi , ei > Authenticate ME
Sign ei : SAC (ei )
2.  < IDi , ei ,  IDAC, SAC (ei ) > Check Vi 's eligibility
Sign ei : Si= SVS (ei )
3.   < IDi ,  Si >  Unblind Si get yi
Encrypt ki with Kcs :
 
fi=PKcs
(ki )
4.   < xi ,  yi  ,  fi > 
Encrypt  fi with KAC
5.   < xi ,  yi  ,  IDAC ,  EKAC
(fi ) >
 
6.   < l , xi ,  yi  ,  IDAC > 
 7.   < l , xi ,  yi  >
8.   < KAC  ,  IDAC > 
Send confirmation
Decrypt yi, Reveal vi 
Count the vote
Publish the list of 
< l , xi ,  yi  , fi >
Publish the list of
< IDi , ei >
Check if yi  is a valid 
signature VS on xi
Figure 2: The GSM mobile voting scheme
4.4.1 The Pre-voting Phase
In this phase, voter Vi fills in a ballot and obtains a voting token from VS
without revealing the vote vi.
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Initially, voter Vi fills in a ballot generated by the application on the
mobile voting device ME. The ME completes the ballot by committing it
to xi as xi = B(vi, ki) using a randomly chosen key ki, and blinds xi by
computing ei = g(xi, ri). Here, ri is a randomly chosen blinding factor. Both
ki and ri are generated by the ME within the application. Then Vi sends
< IDi, ei > to AC through GSM, shown in message 1 of Figure 2.
Upon receiving the message from voter Vi, AC authenticates the ME and
checks the Home Location Register (HLR), where the subscriber’s informa-
tion is stored, verifying that the voter is who she claims to be. Then AC
applies its signature and forwards it to VS along with its ID as
< IDi, ei, IDAC , SAC(ei) >, shown in message 2.
By checking the signature of AC, VS is confident that AC has already au-
thenticated the voter. It then verifies the eligibility of Vi to vote by checking
the database to see if the voter has voted before, and adds Vi’s information
to the database as < IDi, ei >. Most importantly in this phase, VS issues a
voting token to the eligible voter without revealing the vote vi, so after veri-
fying the eligibility of the voter, VS signs the committed and blinded vote ei
with its own signature and sends it back to the voter Vi as si = SV S(ei) with
IDi, which is < IDi, si >, shown in message 3.
Upon receiving the message from VS, the voter Vi unblinds si to obtain the
signature yi = h(si, ri). If yi is a valid signature of VS upon xi, the voter can
use it as a voting token to cast her vote in the Voting Phase. Otherwise, voter
Vi reports to the voting authority, in provision of the evidence of < xi, yi >.
At the end of the Pre-voting phase, VS announces the number of voters
who registered and have been given a voting token, and publishes the entry
< IDi, ei >.
4.4.2 The Voting Phase
After VS publishes the entries of the registered voters, voters can check the
list, and claim any errors during the registration by providing the evidence
< xi, yi >. Now voters can cast their votes with the verified token anytime
they want before the voting deadline. In [7], the scheme assumes that voters
cast their votes through an anonymous channel to protect voters’ privacy.
In the proposed scheme, we achieve the privacy of voters by making use of
GSM’s AC.
Vi encrypts ki with the CS’s public key kCS as fi = PkCS(ki), and sends
< xi, yi, fi > to AC, shown in message 4. By encrypting ki with kCS, AC
cannot observe the voter Vi’s vote, and only CS can reveal ki by decrypting
fi with its private key.
Upon receiving the message, AC encrypts fi with the key kAC , which
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is generated by AC, and is the same for all voters who votes through this
AC. AC will only send kAC to CS when the voting phase finishes, then CS
can open the key to decrypt the votes. By doing this, there is no partial
result revealed to any party before the voting phase finishes. AC sends
< xi, yi, IDAC , EkAC (fi) > to CS, shown in message 5.
After receiving the message, CS checks if yi is a valid VS’s signature
on xi. If it is, CS assigns a serial reference number l for each voter, and
publishes the entry < l, xi, yi >. Otherwise vote is denied. Then CS sends
< l, xi, yi, IDAC > back to AC, and AC forwards < l, xi, yi > back to voter Vi
for confirmation, shown in message 6, 7. Upon receiving the corresponding
reference number l, voters can check the published entries on the bulletin
board, and report any errors.
After the voting phase starts, the registered voters will get a reminder
generated by the application to ask the voter if she wants to cast the vote,
and the voter can choose to vote now, later and not at all. If voter Vi decides
not to vote, the application generates an empty vote, sends it to AC and CS,
and CS publishes it in the list. This empty vote can be pre-loaded, blinded,
signed and cast in the same way as the normal vote is. Hence, the number
of the entry published by VS in the Pre-voting Phase should be the same as
the entry published by CS in the Voting Phase. As a result, even if some
voters choose not to vote, CS cannot forge the vote.
4.4.3 The Post-voting Phase
After the voting phase, the ACs from different networks and regions send the
corresponding kAC to CS, shown in message 8. CS reveals fi using kAC , and
decrypts fi to get ki using CS’s private key. CS can decrypt all the votes with
ki, count them and add fi to the corresponding entry of the list published in
the Voting Phase.
To help understand the protocol, the different status of the votes and the
keys are as shown in Figure 3.
5 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss how and to what extent the protocol fulfils the
security requirements listed in Section 3.
• Democracy Only the authorised voters can vote. First, voters are au-
thenticated through GSM, which assures that voters are who they claim
to be. Further assurance can be provided by using a PIN to protect
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vi ei sixi
yi
ki fi EKAC
(fi)
Unblind
Decrypt
with ki
Commit Blind VS sign
VS sign
Encrypt with KCS Encrypt with KAC 
DecryptDecrypt
Figure 3: Vote Flow
the ME or by using randomly chosen identity-based questions. There-
fore, the authentication of the voter is as good as GSM can provide.
Second, the eligibility of voters is checked by VS. This prevents voters
from voting more than once. All the voters can vote. The whole voting
procedure can be performed remotely using a personal voting device.
Hence, it provides an alternative method for people who cannot go to
the voting booth. It is suitable for voters who travel abroad and voters
who have disabilities. Also, the voting application runs on a mobile
device, which can be written with different language choices, making
the voting application accessible to all voters.
• Privacy All votes remain secret while the voting takes place and each
individual vote cannot be linked to the voter who casts it. The proposed
scheme is divided into three phases, and they are separated in time. In
the pre-voting phase, a blind signature is applied to the vote in a way
that ei is not linkable with yi, and ei is signed without revealing the
vote vi. In the voting phase, the communication between voters and
CS achieves anonymity with the help of AC. The voter Vi sends ki
encrypted with CS’s public key kCS to AC, so the AC is not able to
reveal ki to get the value of the vote vi. While AC is able to link ei,
yi to IDi, it has no knowledge of vi and is not able to link vi to IDi.
Also, CS has no direct communication with voter Vi, so CS cannot tell
which voter casts the vote. Hence, for all the components of the voting
system, if their knowledge of IDi cannot be linked with the vote vi,
the privacy of the voter is protected. To clarify this, the knowledge of
each server and the public can be illustrated in the following table:
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AC VS CS Public
Pre-voting IDi, ei IDi, ei, si IDi, ei
Voting l, IDi, xi, yi, fi l, xi, yi l, xi, yi
Post-voting IDi, li, xi, yi l, xi, yi, fi, vi l, xi, yi, fi
• Accuracy No vote can be altered, duplicated or eliminated without
being detected. At the end of the pre-voting phase, the entry< IDi, ei >
is published, and at the end of the voting phase the entry < l, xi, yi, fi >
is published. Therefore, if any vote is altered, duplicated or eliminated,
it can be detected by the voters. If a voter decides not to vote after
she receives the voting token, the application will send the empty vote
to CS. Hence, AC cannot impersonate a voter.
• Fairness No partial result can be known before the final result comes
out. The voter vi’s commitment key ki is sent to CS in the form of
EkAC (fi), where fi = PkCS(ki). CS can decrypt fi to get ki, but CS
has no knowledge of kAC . The kAC is sent to CS after all voters have
cast their votes or after the voting deadline. Hence, there is no partial
result revealed before the final result.
• Verifiability Individual verifiability is satisfied since the appearance
of < l, xi, yi, fi > assures voter Vi that her vote has been taken into
account. Any observer can verify that the votes taken into account are
legitimate, by verifying the signature yi on xi.
• Recoverability If any failure, mistake or cheating is detected, there
should be proper methods and procedures and information available to
help recover the voting system. The proposed scheme is divided into
three phases, and they are separated in time. After each phase, voters
check the published list of entries. If errors are detected, the voters can
provide their copy of < xi, yi, fi > to recover their votes. In the case
of anomalies in the published list, AC has enough information to check
that votes are legitimate.
In this section, we have shown that the GSM mobile voting system fulfils
the standard set of voting security criteria outlined in Section 3.
However, in our GSM mobile voting scheme, the AC authenticates the
voters in the pre-voting phase, and encrypts the public key encrypted key
which is needed to open final votes. Hence the voters must trust AC not
to reveal the link between IDi, ei, and yi, while CS and VS must trust AC
to authenticate the voters. The trust between GSM mobile operator and
mobile user is based on the formally established agreement between them,
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which defines the trust and the liabilities. The trust between the mobile
operator and the voting servers, namely VS and CS can also be agreed and
formally established before the voting events take place. However, trust is
not the most manageable solution, and when there are different ACs from
different mobile operators involved in the voting system, it will be more
difficult to manage the trust upon them. The elimination of this trust on AC
will be one of the subjects of future work.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed a GSM mobile voting scheme, where the GSM authentication
infrastructure is used to provide voter authentication and improve voter mo-
bility. Authentication is always a difficult requirement to fulfil for remote
voting schemes, most of which apply a public-key based signature scheme for
voter authentication. In our scheme, by using the existing GSM authentica-
tion infrastructure, the public-key overhead is largely reduced. Our scheme
also enhances the security and provides more mobility and convenience to
voters. Where the voters’ privacy is protected by applying a blind signature
scheme. In this paper, we presented the basic structure and protocol of our
GSM based mobile voting system.
However, further work is needed to address the importance we place in
the trust on the AC, and we are therefore investigating options for enhancing
and extending the GSM mobile voting scheme. In future work, we will discuss
end-user device (ME) and application security. We will also address how the
voters obtain the voting application and solutions to provide the integrity
of the voting application running on the ME. The Trusted Platform Module
and smart card solutions will be considered.
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